We examine the use of subsidies to research and development (R&D) in a mixed and a private duopoly market. We show that the socially optimal R&D subsidy is increasing in the degree of spillovers, but it is lower in the private duopoly. The optimal R&D subsidy leads to an increase in total R&D and production; however, it does not lead to the equalization of per firm output and therefore to an efficient distribution of production costs. We also find that privatization of the public firm reduces R&D activity and welfare in the duopoly market. This result stands even when optimal R&D subsidies are provided. We thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. We also thank the Spanish Ministry for financial support (SEJ2004-06948).
Introduction
The social benefits and costs associated with the existence of public firms and, as a consequence, the advisability or not of privatization have been the focus of debate in both the academic and the political world. The academic literature on mixed oligopoly has shown that, in the absence of subsidies, privatizing a public firm improves social welfare under a number of different assumptions. 1 However, it has also been shown that if firms' outputs are subsidized, privatization does not improve welfare (White 1996; Pal and White 1998; Poyago-Theotoky 2001; Fjell and Heywood 2004) .
The above-mentioned contributions focused on production-related inefficiencies and the role of output subsidies in correcting them. In the absence of subsidies, output levels are suboptimal (because the private firm produces too little) and the distribution of costs across firms is inefficient (because the public firm tends to produce more but at a higher marginal cost than a private firm). White (1996) , Pal and White (1998), and Poyago-Theotoky (2001) showed that if the policy maker uses output subsidies to correct those market failures, social welfare is unaffected by privatization (this is the so-called ''irrelevance result''). More recently, Fjell and Heywood (2004) showed that, in fact, social welfare may even decrease if the (ex-)public firm is a Stackelberg leader after privatization. All these results hold in the absence of research and development (R&D) investment.
Interestingly, the issues of R&D competition and R&D subsidies in the context of mixed oligopolies have been explored relatively less extensively. This clearly contrasts with the key role of R&D subsidies and the role of public firms in facilitating innovation and the development of national innovation systems (Hart 1998; Katz 2001) . For example, public firms are key players in sectors such as health care, bio-agriculture, and energy sectors, which are all highly R&D intensive (Oehmke 2001; Aanestad et al. 2003; Godø et al. 2003) . 2 Moreover, public subsidies to R&D are routinely used by governments to encourage technological innovations. For example, the European Union (EU) is running the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7) to foster innovation in the EU with an overall budget of J50,500 million for the period 2007-2014. 3 Thus, the study of R&D activity and R&D subsidies in the context of mixed oligopolies does not only have a purely academic interest but also clear policy relevance.
Some contributions that have studied R&D activity in mixed markets (Delbono and Denicolò 1993; Poyago-Theotoky 1998) show that a public firm is an effective policy tool in that it achieves efficient outcomes in terms of R&D investment. In the same context, Ishibashi and Matsumura (2006) have shown that if innovation size is endogenized, the presence of a public firm might not be enough to warrant a welfare-maximizing outcome. All these contributions focused on patent races (wherein a new product or a new process are introduced) and did not incorporate R&D subsidies into the frame of analysis. 4 In this article, we emphasize this rather neglected aspect in the mixed oligopoly literature by concentrating on the effect of R&D subsidies in the context of a non-tournament R&D competition model (as opposed to a patent race) in which there are distinct appropriability issues as exemplified by the presence of spillovers. We thus turn our attention to a mixed oligopoly investing in efficiency-enhancing R&D-that is, R&D investment leading to a reduction in the marginal cost of production. This type of R&D has become particularly relevant in a number of sectors in recent years (e.g., health care and energy). 5 It is well known that the existence of spillovers discourages this type of R&D by private firms because firms cannot fully appropriate the returns to their R&D investments. Therefore, our first objective is to study to what extent the provision of subsidies to R&D can alleviate this problem. To the best of our knowledge, our article is the first to study the effect of R&D subsidies in a mixed oligopoly.
As mentioned before, regardless of the existence of R&D competition, mixed markets are affected by two production-related inefficiencies (suboptimal output levels and inefficient distribution of production costs). One can argue that an R&D subsidy could be used to tackle 2 There are even some examples of newly established public firms, such as Crown Fibre Holdings Ltd. a public company in New Zealand that will provide broadband access. See http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/govt+releases+broadband +investment+proposal. 3 Another example comes from research in fuel cells and hydrogen technologies in Norway where public funding to R&D was approximately J18 million in 2001 (Godø et al. 2003) . 4 See also Lin and Ogawa (2005) , Matsumura and Matsushima (2004) and Nishimori and Ogawa (2002) . 5 For example, due to the steady rise in costs in recent years, firms in the health care sector are trying to innovate to boost their competitiveness. Moreover, policy makers are also calling for more efficiency in this sector [see, for example CBO Testimony by Peter Orszag (2008) ''Growth in Health Care Costs'']. The climate change is also posing significant challenges in terms of energy efficiency to a wide range of industries. A number of governments are subsidizing energy efficiency innovations, including the EU in its FP7 framework. not only the inefficiencies related to the R&D activity but also, at least partly, those related to production. The reason for this is that the efficiency-enhancing R&D activity will affect output by stimulating production (via the reduction in marginal cost) and, by consequence, the distribution of production costs (depending on the equilibrium levels of investment by the competing firms). Thus, a second objective in our study is to analyze to what extent a subsidy to R&D will have the same or similar effects to an output subsidy.
Our third objective is to offer some tentative policy guidelines regarding the use of subsidies before and after privatization and to analyze whether privatization would be welfare-enhancing both in the presence and in the absence of R&D subsidies. This should shed some light on the difference the presence of the subsidy makes to the change in welfare and R&D following privatization. In fact, in the absence of R&D subsidies, it has been shown that privatizing the public firm tends to reduce R&D activity and welfare (Tomaru 2007; Heywood and Ye 2009). 6 Here, we want to examine whether this result stands if the government subsidizes R&D activity.
We propose a model that uses a homogeneous good Cournot duopoly undertaking costreducing (process) innovation in the presence of spillovers. We introduce subsidies to R&D in the context of a mixed duopoly. We assume that both the public firm and the private firm are ex ante equally efficient and keep the assumption of increasing marginal cost present in White (1996) , Pal and White (1998), Poyago-Theotoky (2001) , and Fjell and Heywood (2004) , among others. These two assumptions jointly imply that any efficiency differential between the private and the public firm is not exogenously imposed but may endogenously arise from firms' output and R&D choices.
Our results show that the optimal R&D subsidy is increasing in the degree of spillovers and it is lower in the private relative to the mixed market. R&D subsidies boost R&D, output, and welfare in both the private and the mixed markets. We argue that an R&D subsidy may partly serve the same purpose as an output subsidy (because it leads to an increase in total output and may correct to a certain extent the inefficient distribution of production costs), although it does not guarantee the equalization of output and therefore marginal costs. Our findings suggest that total R&D investment will decrease after privatization, even when R&D subsidies are provided. The privatization of the public firm tends to increase total profits but always reduces consumer and social welfare. Interestingly, the private firm may actually lose out with privatization in the absence of R&D subsidies if the degree of spillovers is high enough.
We structure the article as follows: In section 2 we present the model. In sections 3 and 4 we solve the mixed and private duopoly cases with and without subsidies and study the effect of R&D subsidies on R&D investments and output. In section 5, we compare the private duopoly and mixed duopoly with and without subsidies and discuss the implications for policy making, with an emphasis on the issue of privatization. Section 6 presents our final remarks. Proofs to propositions and lemmata are relegated to the Appendix. private duopoly. A private firm is profit-maximizing, whereas the public firm is assumed to maximize social welfare. 7 In the case of the mixed duopoly, we denote with subscript 0 the public firm and with subscript 1 the private firm. Demand is linear and given by P(Q) 5 a 2 Q, where Q 5 q i + q j , i ? j, i, j M {0, 1} and Q # a.
Firms invest in R&D to lower their marginal cost of production (process innovation). Then the effective level of R&D, X i , represents the aggregate reduction in firm i's marginal cost due to R&D and has two components: the own R&D output level, x i , and the competitor's, x j , influencing firm i via spillovers
where the extent of information leakage or degree of spillovers among firms is captured by the parameter b, which is exogenously given (0 # b # 1).
To avoid situations in which the private firm is driven out of the market, we assume the existence of diminishing returns to scale by introducing a quadratic term related to production in the firms' cost function. 8 Thus, firm i's total cost function depends on its level of production, q i , and the effective level of R&D, X i ,
This modeling of the cost function reflects the fact that the public firm is 'ex ante' equally as efficient as the private firm; that is, in the absence of R&D and for given quantity, the cost of production is the same for either firm. Given C i (q i , X i ), the marginal cost of production is
This increasing marginal cost leads to a higher unit cost for the public firm, as ceteris paribus, the public firm produces more than the private firm in equilibrium. The realization of this efficiency differential depends on the firm's R&D and production levels. In other words, we do not assume the existence of a cost differential between firms, but rather, such a differential arises endogenously in equilibrium (see below). Notice that the effective level of R&D, X i , affects only the intercept of the marginal cost (i.e., it shifts the marginal cost curve downward) but not its slope. 9 R&D is costly with its cost given by C(x i ) 5 cx 2 i , c . 0. This reflects diminishing returns to R&D investment (or effort/input) x i . For tractability, we set c 5 1 which ensures non-negativity of all variables. By spending x 2 i in R&D, a firm can lower its costs by x i because of its own research effort and by an additional amount, bx j , via unpaid appropriation of some part of the rival firm's effort. Furthermore, the government subsidizes the R&D level of each firm. Each firm receives a subsidy s per unit of R&D output S(x i ) 5 sx i . 10,11 Thus, the private firm maximizes the following,
whereas the public firm maximizes social welfare (SW) defined as the sum of consumer surplus (CS) and producer surplus (PS) net of R&D subsidies.
which, after aggregating, yields
Note that the subsidy cancels out when aggregating. This implies that the subsidy has no direct effect on social welfare and, hence, on the objective function of the public firm. However, the public firm's R&D (and output) will still be affected by the subsidy indirectly through its effect on the private firm's R&D choice.
To study the effects of R&D subsidization on innovation, along with the effects of privatization on innovation, firm profitability, and welfare, we consider a multistage game with observable actions. The time structure of the game unfolds as follows: in stage 1, the government chooses the level of the subsidy to R&D to maximize social welfare. In stage 2, firms make simultaneously their R&D decisions and then play a standard Cournot game in the third stage. We solve the game for a mixed duopoly (wherein one of the firms maximizes social welfare and the other maximizes output) and for a private oligopoly (wherein both firms are profit maximizers). We denote with superscript m the mixed duopoly and with p the private duopoly. The game is solved by backward induction. For comparison purposes, we also obtain the equilibrium results for the mixed and the private duopolies in the absence of R&D subsidies. 12
Mixed Duopoly
In this section, we study the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE henceforth) for a mixed duopoly. In the last stage, each firm chooses the quantity that maximizes its objective function, taking the quantity of the other firm as given. Solving the system of first-order conditions (FOC henceforth) of the relevant maximization problems yields the following Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities: 13 10 Our results remain robust in the case that the government subsidizes R&D expenditure. The calculations in that case are available from the authors upon request. 11 The government uses a uniform R&D subsidy. The case of differential or targeted R&D subsidies, although interesting, lies outside the scope of the present article. 12 In these cases, the game is reduced to the last two stages and the subsidy rate is zero. To avoid unnecessary duplications, we will solve the more general cases (mixed and private duopolies with subsidies) and will obtain the equilibrium results for the cases without subsidies by setting s 5 0 after having obtained the solutions to the second stage. 13 We have checked that the second order conditions (and stability conditions where relevant) for the solutions to all the stages of both the mixed and the private duopoly games. They are fulfilled in all cases. Although not reported here, they are available from the authors upon request.
Note that 4 2 b $ 4b 2 1 (and 3 2 b $ 3b 2 1), implying that a firm's own R&D contributes more to its output than to its rival's output (except for b 5 1). After substituting these equilibrium quantities into social welfare and into the private firm's profit function, we proceed to solve the R&D stage.
R&D Stage
In the second stage, the public firm chooses R&D (cost reduction) to maximize welfare, whereas the private firm decides on its R&D to maximize profit. Given q m 0 and q m 1 from above, the relevant FOCs give rise to the following R&D best response functions
r
We make a couple of observations regarding the best-response functions above. First, the best-response function of the public firm does not depend on the subsidy, s. This implies that the subsidy does not affect directly the level of R&D investment of the public firm. In fact, the subsidy only affects indirectly the public firm through the level of R&D investment of its counterpart. This is because the subsidy has no effect on the objective function of the public firm (it is an inflow for the public firm but an outflow for the government; therefore, it cancels out in the social welfare function). However, the subsidy still affects the equilibrium level of R&D by the public firm through the effect it exerts on the private firm's R&D. Second, the slope of r 0 (x 1 ) and r 1 (x 0 ) is negative for low values of b and positive for higher values of b, implying that R&D is a strategic substitute/complement, depending on the extent of spillovers. The following lemma elaborates. LEMMA 1. In the mixed duopoly, R&D is (a) a strategic substitute for both firms for b , 0.17, (b) a strategic substitute for the private firm but a strategic complement for the public firm for 0.17 , b , 0.33, and (c) a strategic complement for both firms for b . 0.33.
Lemma 1 shows that R&D is initially a strategic substitute and becomes a strategic complement, as spillovers intensify, for both the private and the public firm. The intuition for this is the following. An increase in the R&D investment by firm i leads in the first instance to a decrease in the output by its competitor (which now is comparatively less efficient), thereby reducing its incentives to conduct R&D. 14 However, a second effect arises because of the existence of spillovers: An increase in the R&D investment by firm i leads to a decrease in firm j's marginal cost through the spillovers, which will have a positive effect on firm j's output and incentives to conduct R&D. If the degree of spillovers is high enough, the second effect will outweigh the first one, and as a consequence, the R&D investment on both firms are positively related (strategic complements). Lemma 1 also states that the threshold value of the spillovers, which turns R&D into a strategic complement (rather than substitute), is lower for the public firm because the public firm places a higher value on the spillovers than the private firm, in that it internalizes their social value.
Solving the system of Equations 9 and 10, we obtain the R&D equilibrium outcomes as a function of the subsidy s:
, ð11Þ
The equilibrium quantities can also be rewritten as:
Setting s 5 0 in Equations 11-13, we obtain the SPNE solutions for the mixed duopoly without subsidies. Table 1 summarizes these results.
14 As R&D investment carries a fixed cost, the higher the output by firm i, the higher the profitability of conducting R&D for firm i. 
It is relatively straightforward to observe from the results in Table 1 that, in the absence of subsidies, the public firm invests more on R&D than the private firm, that is, x m 0 | s50 . x m 1 | s50 . 15 The derivatives of x m 0 | s50 and x m 1 | s50 with respect to b are:
Lx m
From Equation 15, it is clear that the public firm's R&D investment is increasing in b even without R&D subsidies, since investing in R&D is more socially desirable the higher the degree of spillovers is. 16 In contrast, the private firm's R&D investment is only increasing in b for very high degrees of spillover (b . 0.88) in the absence of subsidies. In other words, as the degree of spillovers increases, the private firm tends to free-ride more heavily on the public firm's investment, except when the degree of spillovers is almost perfect.
From Table 1 , it is easy to see that the public firm produces more than the private firm in the equilibrium without subsidies; that is, q m 0 | s50 . q m 1 | s50 . However, the public firm also invests more on R&D than the private firm (x m 0 | s50 . x m 1 | s50 ). As a consequence, it is yet unclear whether the marginal costs (mc) of production of the public firm will be lower than that of private firm in the equilibrium. 17 Substituting
Comparing mc m 0 | s50 and mc m 1 | s50 , we now establish that the public firm's marginal cost of production is higher than that of the private firm in equilibrium, indicating that there are inefficiencies related to the distribution of the productions costs (it would best if the last units of output produced by the public firm had been produced by the private firm).
Next, we proceed to examine the effect that a positive R&D subsidy has in correcting the inefficiencies associated to innovation and output and marginal cost levels by means of comparative statics.
R&D Subsidization and R&D Output (Cost Reduction)
The following lemma shows the effect of changes in the subsidy rate on firms' R&D output.
LEMMA 2.
(a) The private firm's R&D is increasing in the subsidy for all b M [0, 1]. 15 It is also interesting to note that the public firm's profits are unambiguosly positive for any b. 16 The higher b is, the more effectively knowledge is transferred across firms and therefore, the higher the efficiency gains R&D investment. 17 Recall that the marginal cost of production is increasing in the output level. Part (a) of Lemma 2 follows from the best-response function of the private firm, which shifts out as s increases (see Equation 10). It follows that the private firm's R&D investment is always increasing in the subsidy because the subsidy is a net inflow for the private firm. However, the same does not apply to the public firm because the subsidy also enters the social welfare function as a cost, cancelling out the positive effect of the subsidy. Thus, the subsidy has only an indirect effect on the public firm's behavior through the private firm's R&D, as explained above. The relationship between the two firms' R&D investments (substitution or complementarity) will determine the effect of an increase in the subsidy on the public firm's R&D. We know from Lemma 1 that R&D investments are strategic substitutes (complements) from the point of view of the public firm if b ,($) 0.17. Thus, if b $(,) 0.17, an increase in s leads to an increase in the private firm's R&D investment in the first instance and, as a consequence of this, to an increase (decrease) in the public firm's investment due to strategic complementarity (substitution), as stated in part (b).
Finally, part (c) shows that the decrease in the public firm's R&D level (if it takes place) will be outweighed by the increase in the private firm's, resulting in an increase in the total R&D. That is, the public firm will not reduce its R&D investment (if at all) as s increases to the extent of lowering aggregate R&D levels.
R&D Subsidization and Output Levels (Costs Distribution)
In the next lemma, we analyze the effect of changes in the subsidy rate on the equilibrium output levels. Lemma 3 states that a threshold value for the spillover exists such that the net effect of the subsidy on the public firm's output can be positive or negative. Two effects are interacting and determining this result: (a) The R&D subsidy affects the public firm's output via the effect it exerts on its own R&D. In particular, we know from Lemma 2 that the public firm's R&D is decreasing (increasing) in s for b ,(.) 0.17. (b) The R&D subsidy affects the public firm's output via the output of the private firm. An increase in the subsidy leads to an increase in the private firm's R&D and output, which in turn leads to a decrease in the public firm's output. The indirect effect in (b) will only be compensated by the effect in (a) for b . 0.23. Regarding the private firm, the result is clear-cut: a higher subsidy will always lead to higher output because the positive effect of the private R&D on the private firm's output dominates the negative effect through the public firm's output. As well, total output is increasing in s, which highlights the positive association between R&D and output decisions. Thus, an R&D subsidy may serve a similar purpose to an output subsidy, as it boosts total output levels. White (1996) has shown that an output subsidy results in the redistribution of output from the (ex-post) higher marginal cost public firm to the lower marginal cost private firm. Here, we want to explore whether an R&D subsidy could serve a similar purpose. Interestingly, we can infer from Lemmata 2 and 3 that the effectiveness of an R&D subsidy in redistributing costs depends crucially on the extent of spillovers. In fact, both R&D investments and outputs by the two firms converge as s increases for low values of b. Therefore, at least for low values of b, the R&D subsidy could improve the distribution of production costs across firms. In the next section, we derive the optimal R&D subsidy and analyze whether it can lead to the equalization of output and consequently marginal costs across firms. In addition, we investigate the role of the subsidy on social welfare.
Optimal R&D Subsidy and Its Effects
The government chooses the value of the R&D subsidy that maximizes welfare. Substituting equilibrium R&D and quantities into the social welfare objective function and solving the FOC with respect to s, we find the equilibrium R&D subsidy.
Using this, we calculate the equilibrium solutions for the mixed duopoly with optimal subsidies, summarized in Table 2 . From Table 2 , it is straightforward to see that when R&D subsidies are provided, the public firm produces more and invests more on R&D than the private firm. That is, q m 0 . q m 1 and x m 0 . x m 1 . The following Proposition characterizes the optimal R&D subsidy. PROPOSITION 1. In the mixed duopoly, the optimal R&D subsidy is positive and increasing in the magnitude of the spillovers.
According to Proposition 1, the R&D subsidy in the mixed duopoly is positive and increasing in the spillovers. The rationale behind this result stems from the role that the R&D 
subsidy plays in correcting a market failure associated with the imperfect appropriability of R&D due to the existence of spillovers. Next, we elaborate on this.
Recall that we have stated before that, in the absence of R&D subsidies, the existence of spillovers generates a free-riding problem, as the private firm tends to invest less on R&D as b increases, except for very high bs. An optimal subsidy to R&D alleviates this problem by inducing the private firm to invest more as b increases. This can be seen from the derivative of x m 1 with respect to b:
where c 1 5 (6510 + 828b 2 1372b 2 2 91b 3 2 98b 4 + 49b 5 ) . 0 Y b, b M [0, 1]. Moreover, as in the case without subsidies, the public firm's R&D investment is increasing in b when optimal subsidies to R&D are provided:
where c 2 5 (7116 + 525b 2 1456b 2 2 28b 3 2 98b 4 + 49b 5 ) . 0. As before, the reason is that investing in R&D is more socially desirable the higher the degree of spillovers. Thus, when an optimal subsidy to R&D is used, the R&D levels of both the private and the public firm are increasing in the degree of spillovers. This emphasizes the role of the R&D subsidy in correcting the free-riding problem that exists in the absence of subsidization. 18 We concluded the previous subsection, leaving open the question of whether an optimal R&D subsidy would lead to the equalization of firms' outputs and therefore costs. We have previously argued (see the ''Optimal R&D Subsidy and Its Effects'' section) that a positive R&D subsidy will tackle the inefficiencies derived from R&D competition and could potentially address (at least partly) the inefficient distribution of production costs. Table 2 reports q m 0 and q m 1 . It is relatively straightforward to see that q m 0 . q m 1 for any 0 , b , 1. However, we also know that x m 0 . x m 1 , which implies that the intercept of marginal cost function is lower for the public firm than for the private firm. Substituting x m 0 , x m 1 , q m 0 , and q m 1 into Equation 3, we find the marginal cost for the two firms in equilibrium:
mc m
Comparing the marginal cost in equilibrium of the public and the private firm under subsidization, we can state the following: 18 Interestingly, total R&D investment levels are increasing in b not only when optimal R&D subsidies are provided but also if subsidies are not provided (since (Lx m 0 /hb)| s50 ) . Abs[(Lx m 1 /hb)| s50 ]). In other words, the mere presence of the private firm partially corrects the problem derived from the imperfect appropriability of the R&D results. However, as shown in Lemma 2, total R&D investment is higher in the presence of subsidies than in their absence. This highlights the additional benefits of employing R&D subsidies even in cases where a public firm is being used by the government as a policy tool to tackle the inefficiencies derived from R&D activity.
In other words, the public firm's marginal cost in equilibrium is higher than that of the private firm. An optimal R&D subsidy fails to bring about the equalization of output across firms; therefore, it does not lead to an efficient distribution of the marginal costs. Our results show that R&D subsidies will not be enough to correct the inefficiencies related to distribution of production costs either when there are spillovers. 19 Thus, the use of an R&D subsidy only achieves a second best outcome. In fact, given the existence of both output-and R&D-related subsidies, achieving the social optimum (first best) would require the use of both R&D-and output-related instruments. In fact, in a model with R&D competition but without spillovers, Zikos (2007) has showed that a combination of taxes on R&D and a subsidy to output could correct both R&D-and production-related inefficiencies. However, it can be argued that the public might not be likely to accept a policy involving taxation of R&D investment; therefore, such a policy may not be implementable by the government-hence, the relevance of studying the second best. Our findings point toward the trade-off facing policy makers when using R&D subsidies in mixed markets with spillovers: R&D subsidies encourage total R&D investment and counteract the private firms' incentive to free-ride on the public firm's investment but will do this at the expense of perpetuating the inefficient allocation of production costs. 20 Before closing this section, we want to compare welfare levels in the mixed oligopoly with and without subsidies. It is obvious that when an optimal R&D subsidy is in place, social welfare cannot be lower than without R&D subsidies (because the R&D subsidy is set to maximize social welfare). In fact, it is easy to show that the difference between social welfare with and without optimal R&D subsidies is strictly positive for all b M [0, 1]. Regarding the effect of the degree of spillovers on this difference, we can state the following:
The difference between the social welfare levels attained with and without an optimal R&D subsidy is strictly increasing in the degree of spillovers. It is worth noting that this result has been derived in a context where subsidies do not involve any deadweight loss. However, it implies that there is some scope to assume deadweight losses in order to provide subsidies because they will boost welfare, particularly as the degree of spillovers intensifies.
The following proposition summarizes the discussion presented in this section: PROPOSITION 2. In the mixed duopoly, the use of an optimal R&D subsidy leads to an increase in total R&D investment, output, and welfare, although it is not sufficient to guarantee the efficient distribution of production costs.
Private Duopoly
In this case, both firms are profit maximizers. In the final stage of the game, both firms choose output to maximize profits. Solving the system of the associated FOCs, we obtain the stage-three equilibrium outputs, which is common for both regimes (with and without subsidies): 19 Note that the R&D subsidy does not affect the equilibrium outcomes in the last stage (output). 20 The reader may wonder whether the SPNE investments are higher than those that minimise cost. Interestingly, the magnitude of the subsidy does not affect the cost minimising investments and, in fact, both firm's cost minimising investments are higher than the SPNE R&D investments both without and with an (optimal) R&D subsidy. Details of these calculations are available from the authors upon request.
Substituting these into the profit function of both firms and solving the system of FOCs, we obtain the following R&D best-response functions:
As in the mixed duopoly, R&D is initially a strategic substitute and becomes a strategic complement, as the degree of spillovers increases. 21 Solving the system of the R&D best-response functions, we find the equilibrium R&D outputs
Similar to the effect of the subsidy on private R&D in the mixed duopoly, note that R&D is also positively related to the subsidy in the private duopoly. The equilibrium output as function of the subsidy is written as
In this case, too, the quantities produced depend positively on the amount of the subsidy, with this effect being the outcome of the positive R&D-output association. Substituting equilibrium R&D and equilibrium quantities into the expression for social welfare and performing the maximization with respect to s, we obtain
The result above is the equilibrium-optimal R&D subsidy in the private duopoly. Analogous to s m , one can easily establish that s p is positive and increasing in b. The R&D and output equilibrium solutions for the public and the private firms' R&D in the absence of subsidies are readily obtained from x p i and q p i by setting s 5 0 and s 5 s p , respectively, as summarized in Tables 3 and 4. For completeness, we also analyze the role of the subsidies in the private duopoly in correcting the market failures associated with the existence of spillovers. It is interesting to note that without subsidies, the derivative of x p i with respect to b is negative:
That is, as b increases, firms tend to invest less on R&D because firms tend to free-ride more on each other's R&D efforts as b increases. Again, this is socially inefficient because R&D becomes more socially desirable as the degree of spillovers increases. Analogous to the mixed oligopoly case, a R&D subsidy alleviates this problem. In contrast, in the case with an optimal subsidy, the derivative of x p i with respect to b is positive: 21 Here, the threshold value for the spillover degree is b 5 0.25.
Thus, in the private duopoly case, when subsidies are provided, R&D is increasing in the degree of spillovers. This implies that an R&D subsidy counteracts the incentives to reduce the level of R&D investment as the degree of spillovers increases. Furthermore, the total level of R&D will be higher when subsidies are used than when they are not. This can easily be seen from the increasing equilibrium level s of R&D in Equation 26. Finally, comparing welfare levels with and without subsidies (see Tables 3 and 4 ), we can state that the use of an optimal subsidy boosts social welfare in the private oligopoly. 22 The next proposition summarizes the discussion presented in this section:
PROPOSITION 3. In the private duopoly, the use of an optimal R&D subsidy leads to an increase in total R&D investment, output, and welfare. 22 Moreover, as in the case of the mixed oligopoly, the higher the degree of spillovers is, the higher the difference between the level of social that could be achieved with optimal R&D subsidies and without subsidies. 
Welfare Comparisons
In this section, we compare R&D output and quantity produced across the two market configurations with and without subsidies and provide some tentative policy guidelines with respect to privatizing the public firm. We capture privatization in a very simple way: the private duopoly is equivalent to a setup wherein the public firm maximizes its own profit, like the private firm; in other words, the public firm is privatized. Thus, we need to compare the two settings in detail both with and without R&D subsidization. We do this in a series of propositions, starting with the case without subsidies.
No R&D Subsidies (s 5 0)
Without subsidies to R&D in either the mixed or the private duopoly, the following holds: 23 PROPOSITION 4. When R&D subsidies are not provided in either the mixed or the private duopoly, the following hold:
The intuition behind the remarks about the public firm's behavior in the absence of R&D subsidies (i.e., parts [a], [c] and [e]) seems quite clear: As the public firm does not maximize profits but social welfare, it will tend to invest and produce more and obtain lower profits than a private firm in a private duopoly.
Although the results regarding the private firm appear less intuitive, they can be reconciled when taking into account the existence of spillovers. Part (d) states that, in the absence of subsidies, a private firm may produce more in a mixed market than in a private one for high enough degrees of spillovers. In principle, a private firm tends to produce more in a private market than in a mixed one. 24 However, a private firm will experience a higher reduction in its marginal cost through spillovers in a mixed market than in a private market because its competitor in a mixed market invests more on R&D than a private firm would do in a private market, particularly as the degree of spillovers increases. This second effect (higher efficiency gains through spillovers in a mixed market) may lead the private firm to produce more and obtain higher profits in the mixed market for sufficiently high bs, as parts (b) and (e) state. Interestingly, this effect could even induce the private firm to invest more in R&D in a mixed market than in a private one, although this requires practically perfect spillovers, as stated in part (b). 23 Our analysis in this subsection (comparison without subsidies, s 5 0) is similar to the analysis in Heywood and Ye (2009) . Our analysis differs from theirs in that we consider intermediate values of spillovers (which are critical for some of our results), but we do not contemplate the case of partial privatization. Therefore, our results in this section complement the results in Heywood and Ye (2009) . 24 As a reaction to its competitor, which will tend to produce more if it is public than if it is private. The next proposition contains the comparison between the mixed and the private market in terms of total R&D, output and profits. PROPOSITION 5. In the absence of R&D subsidies:
Although in the absence of subsidies, the private firm may invest less on R&D and produce less output in a mixed oligopoly than in a private one, the higher R&D and production activity by the public firm will compensate for this, leading to higher aggregate R&D and output levels in the mixed than in the private market. Both firms' profits increase with privatization. Even when the public firm's profits will be reduced after privatization (b . 0.75), the aggregate profits will still be higher after the privatization.
Finally, regarding social welfare, the following result obtains: PROPOSITION 6. In the absence of subsidies to R&D, SW m | s50 . SW p | s50 for all b M [0, 1].
The above proposition states that, even without subsidization, social welfare is higher in a mixed oligopoly than in a private duopoly; therefore, privatization would result in a reduction in total surplus. The presence of the public firm in the market boosts aggregate R&D investment and output. This result is in line with the previous literature (Tomaru 2007; Heywood and Ye 2009 ). Furthermore, our analysis also indicates the existence of a public firm in the market can even benefit its (private) competitor via spillovers. Thus, a policy involving privatization without using R&D subsidies may even damage the private firm's profits, particularly for high degrees of spillovers.
Optimal R&D Subsidies (s m , s p )
With optimal subsidies to R&D in both the mixed and the private duopoly, the following holds: PROPOSITION 7. When socially optimal subsidies to R&D are provided both in the mixed and the private duopoly, the following hold: Parts (a) and (c) provide the same qualitative results as in the case without R&D subsidies. That is, the public firm invests more and produces more than a firm in a private duopoly. Part (b) states that the private firm invests more in R&D in a mixed duopoly than in a private duopoly for intermediate to high degrees of spillovers. Because a public firm will invest more on R&D than a firm in a private market (see part [a] ) and the R&D investments are strategic complements for high degrees of spillovers and substitutes for lower degrees of spillovers (as Lemma [1] shows), it follows that the private firm will tend to invest more (less) in R&D in a mixed market than in a private one for high (low) degrees of spillovers. Furthermore, a private firm produces more and obtains more profits in a private duopoly than in the mixed duopoly for any b, as parts (d) and (f) state. This differs from the result presented in the case without subsidies, in which we argued that the private firm could benefit from the presence of a public firm via spillovers for sufficiently high b and this could compensate for the fiercer competitor in the mixed market. With R&D subsidies, there is not such a large difference between the efficiency gains from spillovers in the mixed and in the private market, in that the R&D subsidy stimulates investment by the competing private firm. Thus, the negative effect from the more intense competition in the mixed market prevails. Part (e) suggests that a public firm could obtain higher profits than a firm in a private market if b . 0.65. In addition to facing less strong competition in the mixed than in the private market, 25 the public firm might even obtain higher efficiency gains via spillovers in a mixed market, as long as the spillover degree is high enough. 26 Thus, for high degrees of spillovers, the two effects go in the same direction and the public firm obtains higher profits in the mixed market than if it were privatized. PROPOSITION 8. When optimal R&D subsidies are provided: The above proposition states that the presence of a public firm boosts total R&D investment and output when optimal R&D subsidies are provided. Total profit is also higher in the mixed duopoly except for very high degrees of spillovers. The reason for this is that although the private firm will be worse off in a private market, the higher profits by the public firm may compensate this if and only if the degrees of spillovers are high enough.
Bringing together the effect of a privatization on consumer surplus and on producer surplus, we can state the following: PROPOSITION 9. Under a policy of providing socially optimal subsidies to R&D, SW m j s~s m . SW p j s~s p for all b M [0, 1].
Although privatization of the public firm would reduce aggregate output levels and thus lower consumer surplus, it would also lead to higher producer surplus, not only for the private firm, but also for the privatized (expublic) firm, as long as spillovers are too high. It turns out that the former negative effect (lower consumer surplus) dominates the latter positive one (higher producer surplus unless spillovers are almost perfect), inducing a decline in social welfare following privatization.
Comparing the optimal subsidy to R&D in the mixed and in the private market, we establish the following: In other words, the government should provide a larger subsidy in the mixed market than in the fully private market, ceteris paribus. The intuition for this results because output will be higher in a mixed market than in a private market, therefore rendering investing in R&D more socially profitable in a mixed than in a private market.
Discussion
The results obtained in the two previous subsections yield several interesting insights into a class of questions relevant to policy making. According to these results, privatization does reduce consumer surplus, not only because the public firm produces more than a private firm but also because the presence of the public firm boosts total R&D spending, which in turn favors output. When optimal R&D subsidies are provided both before and after privatization, total profits will generally decrease after privatization. Without R&D subsidies, however, total profits are bound to increase with privatization, although the private firm may actually lose out by benefiting less from R&D spillovers in the private market. All in all, in both cases, the increase in total profits will not outweigh the decrease in consumer surplus, rendering lower levels of social welfare. Thus, our results offer some support to the view against the widespread adoption of privatization programs. 27 In addition to these results, we have shown in section 3 that R&D subsidies boost total R&D investments, total output, and social welfare in the mixed (and also in the private) duopoly. This highlights the additional benefits of using an R&D subsidy to tackle market failures even when a public firm is already present in the market.
The reader may wonder whether our results regarding the effects of privatization can be reconciled with the existing empirical evidence. Interestingly, Katz (2001) provides evidence that recently privatized Latin American firms scaled down their R&D activities after their privatization. Likewise, Munari (2002) and Munari, Roberts, and Sobrero (2002) presented similar evidence of restructuring and scaling down of R&D activity in several case studies about firms from different countries. 28 Using a panel of recently privatized firms, showed that firms tend to patent more after being privatized. This is not necessarily in contrast with our results. 29 In fact, the results of indicate that the increase in patent activity is not the result of increases in R&D investment (in fact, they find that firms invest less in R&D after being privatized). Rather, it is the result of the change in firms' objectives following privatization (from maximizing social welfare to maximizing profits), which leads firms to restructure their R&D activity and focus on innovations with higher commercial value (perhaps in detriment of those with higher social value). 30 In this article, we have assumed the existence of two firms. It is therefore interesting to check whether our result regarding the desirability of privatization extends to an oligopoly. Robustness checks reveal that privatization increases total surplus only if the number of private firms is sufficiently large, in line with the literature (e.g., De Fraja and Delbono 1989) . 31 The reason for this is that privatizing the public firm improves productive efficiency (firms in the private oligopoly produce the same amount of output and so operate at equal costs) but reduces the level of industry output. The gains in terms of productive efficiency outweigh the 27 Following White (1996) , we have also compared the case where a subsidy is provided in the mixed oligopoly with a private oligopoly without subsidies. In such a case, social welfare also decreases with the privatisation of the public firm. 28 In only one case privatization was not followed by a decrease in R&D activity. This is the case of the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone. Interestingly, the authors argue that in the Japanese case, law restrictions are in place so that R&D activity is not diminished in consideration of social welfare following a privatization. 29 In fact, our model is not directly comparable in this case, because we focus on R&D activity when there are spillovers and where innovations cannot be patented. 30 Similar observations are made in Ansal and Soyak (1999) in two case studies about Turkish firms. 31 The calculations are available from the authors upon request. losses in terms of allocative efficiency only when the number of private firms is relatively large. In other words, in markets with a relatively small number of firms, privatization would lower social welfare, even if (optimal) R&D subsidies were provided by the government. In markets with a relatively large number of firms, we conjecture that a combination of R&D and output policy tools would be necessary to make the privatization of the public firm irrelevant from the point of view of social welfare. In other words, we expect that the so-called ''irrelevance'' result (i.e., the privatization of the public firm not affecting social welfare) identified in White (1996) , Pal and White (1998) , Poyago-Theotoky (2001) , and Zikos (2007) could be regained if a combination of R&D and output subsidies or taxes were implemented.
Concluding Remarks
Although the literature on R&D has studied extensively the issue of R&D investment in the presence of spillovers, very little attention has been paid to the presence of public firms and the role of public policy in this context. However, strong empirical evidence points to the importance of the public sector in highly innovative industries. In this article, we extend and enrich the relevant literature by introducing a public firm in the context of a duopoly with spillovers and cost-reducing R&D in order to study the role of subsidies to R&D and the effect of privatization of the public firm on R&D and welfare both in the presence and in the absence of R&D subsidies.
Our findings suggest that the optimal R&D subsidy is positive and increasing in the degree of spillovers. We have shown that an R&D subsidy leads to an increase in total R&D (as it tackles the problems derived from the imperfect appropriability of R&D results) and, in a similar fashion to an output subsidy, it also leads to an increase in total output levels. However, an R&D subsidy does not lead to the equalization of output and therefore to an efficient distribution of production costs across firms. We have also shown that the policy maker should adjust downward the subsidy rates after privatization of the public firm because welfare maximization requires higher subsidization rates in the mixed than in the private duopoly.
According to our results, privatization reduces consumer surplus, irrespective of the use of R&D subsidies. This occurs not only because the public firm tends to produce more than a private firm but also because the presence of the public firm boosts total R&D spending which stimulates production. When optimal R&D subsidies are provided both before and after privatization, total profits will tend to increase after privatization. Without R&D subsidies, however, total profits necessarily increase with privatization, although, perhaps surprisingly, the profits of the private firm can actually be lower after a privatization. The reason for this is that a private firm may be benefiting more from knowledge spillovers when competing with a public firm than when competing with a private firm because the public firm tends to invest more on R&D than a private firm. All in all, the increase in total profits will not outweigh the decrease in consumer surplus, rendering lower levels of social welfare. This result stands even if the policy maker provides optimal R&D subsidies. Thus, privatization cannot be recommended in our context, at least, in cases where number of private firms in the market is relatively small.
More generally, our analysis has indicated that policy makers face a trade-off between R&D spending and productive efficiency when designing optimal policies for market intervention. While the presence of a public firm may increase total spending in R&D this tends to come at the cost of introducing another type of distortion related to the composition of R&D and related cost asymmetry. An R&D subsidy may boost R&D investment and consequently output but does not eliminate completely the inefficient distribution of production costs. Hence, a public firm, R&D subsidies, or both may be useful as policy instruments, although with certain limitations.
It should be stressed that these policy implications have been derived within a rather limited context, and care should be taken in generalizing them. However, even within this limited context, it is clear that the conventional presumption about the desirability and efficiency of privatization can be overturned when specific features, such as R&D and appropriability issues, are considered. Further research is certainly welcome to better understand the circumstances under which the pursuit of privatization policies may be desirable from a social viewpoint. In particular, it would be worthwhile to allow more general demand and cost functions in the frame of analysis. 1 s~s m for any b because (78 + 4b 2 75b 2 + 7b 4 ) . (45 2 18b 2 64b 2 + 7b 4 ) Y b.
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